

Health Savings Accounts and life-cycle saving: Implications for retirement preparedness

Key takeaways

- By bridging health insurance and retirement saving decisions, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) complicate the set of choices regarding how much to save and when to withdraw assets across accounts.
- Determining how HSAs should be used in conjunction with other savings vehicles requires machine-learning techniques, rather than standard methods of solving life-cycle models.
- HSAs raise optimal tax-preferred saving, compared to a system with only tax-preferred illiquid retirement accounts and taxable liquid saving.
- At low levels of contribution rates, which are what is commonly observed in practice, HSAs and illiquid retirement accounts are complements rather than substitutes.

Leora Friedberg

University of Virginia

Adam LeiveUniversity of California,
Berkeley**Jaeki Jang**Korea Institute
for Industrial Economics
and Trade**Eric R. Young**University of Virginia
and Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland

Background

Most employees at large firms today have access to Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), and over 1 in 5 employees across all firms are enrolled in one (Claxton et al. 2021). Since HSAs were created by the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003, they have grown in popularity as more employers that offer health insurance embrace high-deductible health plans (HDHPs). HSAs offer powerful tax advantages, even compared to retirement accounts. As with a defined contribution (DC) plan like a 401(k) or 403(b) account, HSA contributions are income tax-deductible and interest grows tax-deferred; yet contributions are also exempt from FICA taxes, and assets are not subject to required minimum distributions in old age. Moreover, HSA funds remain accessible on a pre-tax basis for health care expenses incurred at not just the current but also at earlier times, providing unparalleled flexibility. They can finance Medicare premiums and long-term care tax-free in retirement. Funds can also be used to finance health care expenses while working. Unlike Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs), all the money in HSAs rolls over from one year to the next.

While these features should, in principle, make HSAs an attractive vehicle for saving, HSA balances remain small. The average balance is just \$3,600, and funds are rarely invested (Fronstin and Spiegel 2021). Many employees avoid HDHP/HSA plans altogether, even when they (commonly) save the employee substantial amounts of money compared to other health insurance choices (Leive, Friedberg and Davis 2022, Liu and Sydnor 2022). Several factors may explain why many consumers avoid HDHPs, including information frictions and perceived hassle costs (Handel and Kolstad 2015), inertia (Handel 2013), liquidity constraints (Ericson and Sydnor 2018, Davis, Leive and Gellert 2022), and financial literacy (Davis, Leive and Gellert 2022). There has been relatively less research on the implications of HSAs for household finances and retirement preparedness (Aaron, Healy and Khitatrakun 2008, Peter, Soika and Steinorth 2016, Leive 2022), and the existing work has not considered the role of liquidity constraints, which are likely to be important for households facing high deductibles.

How should people use HSAs

By bridging health insurance and retirement saving, HSAs offer a complicated set of choices regarding how much to save and when to withdraw. The accounts provide flexibility both to finance current health care

expenses or save for either health or other expenses in retirement. This study examines how people should use these accounts in conjunction with tax-preferred defined contribution retirement plans and taxable liquid savings.

Determining the optimal amount to save for retirement and when to withdraw assets is an extremely challenging problem that depends on many factors. This problem is further complicated when people have multiple accounts in which they can save. We make headway on the question of how HSAs should be used alongside other savings vehicles by building an economic model of consumption and savings over the life-cycle. While models by definition ignore some features of reality, our model incorporates three accounts with different tax and liquidity characteristics: an HSA, a tax-deferred DC account, and a liquid after-tax account. The model incorporates uncertainty in health spending both while working and in retirement, and we keep track of the stock of out-of-pocket medical expenses, which may be reimbursed out of the HSA at any time. We allow for health spending to vary by age, gender, and health status. The model also includes a second shock to consumption unrelated to health care that is intended to capture the importance of moderately sized shocks such as vehicle or home repairs. Households are unable to borrow in our model, which gives rise to a tension between liquidity and the benefits of tax-preferred saving.

Even with just those components, the standard techniques used by economists to solve lifetime savings models fail. With multiple accounts, each with different features and limitations, the combination of saving and withdrawal decisions across all of them becomes large very quickly. These decisions depend on both choices and shocks in previous periods. As a result, determining the set of decisions each year that maximize a person's well-being over their life-cycle requires substantial time to solve, even with modern computing power. Furthermore, incorporating constraints on how much a person can save, withdraw, or borrow can make the solution even more difficult to find.

Therefore, we draw on advances in machine learning to determine how much a person should save and withdraw over their life-cycle. While such methods have been available for decades (Hornik, Stinchcombe and White 1989), the economics literature has only recently begun to utilize them to solve complex models (Fernández-Villaverde, Hurtado and Nuño 2019, Maliar, Maliar and Winant 2021, Duarte et al. 2022, Azinovic, Gaegauf and Scheidegger forthcoming). Our model determines how

the optimal net saving rate in the taxable liquid account and the optimal withdrawal strategy from the HSA each year vary as we alter fixed contribution rates to the HSA and illiquid account while working. The illiquid account is converted to an annuity at retirement. We then search for which combination of contribution rates to the HSA and illiquid retirement account while working yields the highest lifetime utility.

Fixing the contribution rate across all working years is helpful from a computational perspective and also represents a simple decision rule that is likely to be useful in practice since we do not observe individuals altering their HSA or DC contribution rates frequently.

Therefore, this approach lends itself to considering simple strategies for how much to save while working. It is well known that many individuals apply rules of thumb, seek guidance from multiple sources, and respond to features that should not matter, like defaults (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), while failing to respond to features that should, like employer contributions (Friedberg, Leive and Cai 2020) and employer matches (Bubb and Warren 2020). The employer setting for both HSA and retirement saving decisions, in an era of increasing employer attention to financial wellness, provides opportunities to offer simple contribution strategies or defaults that work in concert.

To explore how decisions may vary across different types of people, we consider employees with different salaries and different levels of initial assets in the taxable, liquid account. Given differing capacities to access cash on hand, along with our progressive income tax system, it is not surprising that the value of HSAs in conjunction with other savings vehicles differs by income and initial assets. We consider earners who start their career earning \$65,000 and higher earners who start their career at \$105,000. The lower salary of \$65,000 corresponds to roughly the median of earnings from the large university setting studied in Leive, Friedberg

and Davis (2022), while the higher salary of \$105,000 corresponds to the 75th percentile. In both cases, we assume 3 percent real wage growth every 5 years throughout a person's career. For both salary levels, we model behavior assuming people are endowed either with no liquid assets or with \$10,000 in liquid assets. We also separately analyze savings by gender given differences in the life-cycle profile and amount of health spending for men and women.


Findings and implications

Our model delivers several findings on the links between HSAs and defined contribution retirement accounts. First, the addition of HSAs to defined contribution accounts is predicted to raise total tax-preferred saving, compared to a situation where people only have illiquid retirement accounts and taxable liquid savings accounts. We observe this pattern for all groups. In our model, the preferred contribution rates to illiquid saving either remains the same or increases slightly, while the maximum contribution is made to the HSA. Relatedly, we observe complementarity between HSAs and illiquid retirement accounts at low to moderate levels of contribution rates. We find at low levels of DC saving, HSAs are complementary to DC accounts but at high levels of DC saving, HSAs are substitutes. Complementarity arises because HSAs provide liquidity to finance health care spending, which allows people to lock up more saving in illiquid DC accounts.


In our model, workers at both salary levels benefit from HSAs. Higher earners benefit more from higher marginal tax rates and higher savings levels, consistent with the empirical patterns observed in tax data (Helmchen et al. 2015). HSAs also offer value to lower earners, providing liquidity insurance that is otherwise difficult to access in current retirement saving vehicles. Optimal saving rates differ mainly by salary, rather than by gender or level of initial assets.

Figure 1. Savings flows over the life-cycle (\$)


(a) \$65,000 salary, men




(b) \$65,000 salary, women



(c) \$105,000 salary, men



(d) \$105,000 salary, women



Notes: Figures plot the path of total savings and HSA savings over the life-cycle for the optimal contribution rates from the model. Total savings include balances in the taxable liquid account, illiquid account, and HSA. For all groups, wage growth is set at 3 percent between each 5-year period while working.

Figure 1 simulates the path of total savings (solid line) and HSA assets (dashed line) over time from the model for employees with different salary levels. HSA assets peak at the start of retirement for each group, at the same time that the other assets—which are larger by comparison—also peak. HSAs comprise a substantially larger share of total savings for lower earners than higher earners, since absolute amounts of HSA balances are similar between groups. All groups also withdraw money from the HSA while working. Even though the HSA has superior tax advantages to the illiquid account and medical expenses rise over the life-cycle, the inability to borrow induces people to use some HSA assets to finance health expenses before retirement.

By unifying the analysis of both health insurance and retirement plan choices—often viewed as unrelated—we demonstrate the dual life-cycle savings possibilities and liquidity insurance features of HSAs. Our findings

build on research demonstrating the correlation of mistakes across both health insurance and retirement saving domains. These mistakes do not take the form of scrimping on cash outlays; rather, with surprising frequency, individuals who fail to take advantage of employer-matching funds overpay for health insurance by avoiding the HDHP/HSA plan (Leive, Friedberg and Davis 2022), suggesting gains that are possible from considering both decisions jointly. While an important subset of employees lack access to one or both types of employer benefits, our analysis applies similarly to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Our research also begins to provide an analytical framework to guide the recent policy focus on emergency savings accounts (Beshears et al. 2019), which may particularly suit individuals who face both difficulty committing to a savings plan and also genuine liquidity needs.

References

- Aaron, Henry, Patrick Healy, and Surachai Khitatrakun. 2008. "What's in a Name? Are Health Savings Accounts Really Health Savings Accounts?" In *Using Taxes To Reform Health Insurance*. 92–118. Washington, DC:Brookings Institution.
- Azinovic, Marlon, Luca Gaegauf, and Simon Scheidegger. forthcoming. "Deep Equilibrium Nets." *International Economic Review*.
- Beshears, John, James Choi, Mark Iwry, David Laibson, and Brigitte Madrian. 2019. "Building Emergency Savings Through Employer-Sponsored Rainy-day Savings Accounts." *NBER Working Paper 26498*.
- Bubb, Ryan, and Patrick Warren. 2020. "An Equilibrium Theory of Retirement Plan Design." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 12(2): 22–45.
- Claxton, Gary, Matthew Rae, Gregory Young, Nisha Kurani, Heidi Whitmore, Jason Kerns, Jackie Cifuentes, Greg Shmavonian, and Anthony Damico. 2021. "2021 Employer Health Benefits Surveys." *Kaiser Family Foundation*.
- Davis, Brent, Adam Leive, and Andrew Gellert. 2022. "How Do Employees Evaluate Workplace Benefits? Evidence from Health Savings Accounts."
- Duarte, Victor, Julia Fonseca, Aaron Goodman, and Jonathan Parker. 2022. "Simple Allocation Rules and Optimal Portfolio Choice Over the Lifecycle." *NBER Working Paper 29559*.
- Ericson, Keith, and Justin Sydnor. 2018. "Liquidity Constraints and the Value of Insurance." *NBER Working Paper 24993*.
- Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, Samuel Hurtado, and Galo Nuño. 2019. "Financial Frictions and the Wealth Distribution." *NBER Working Paper 26302*.
- Friedberg, Leora, Adam Leive, and Wenqiang Cai. 2020. "Balancing Commitment and Liquidity: Empirical Evidence from Mandatory Retirement Saving."
- Fronstin, Paul, and Jake Spiegel. 2021. "Trends in Health Savings Account Balances, Contributions, Distributions, and Investments and the Impact of COVID-19." Employee Benefits Research Institute 538, Washington, DC.
- Handel, Ben, and Jonathan Kolstad. 2015. "Health Insurance for Humans: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare." *American Economic Review*, 105(8): 2449–2500.
- Handel, Benjamin. 2013. "Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts." *American Economic Review*, 103(7): 2643–82.
- Helmchen, Lorens, David Brown, Ithai Lurie, and Anthony Lo Sasso. 2015. "Health Savings Accounts: Growth Concentrated Among High-Income Households and Large Employers." *Health Affairs*, 34(9): 1594–1598.
- Hornik, Kurt, Maxwell Stinchcombe, and Halbert White. 1989. "Multi-Layer Feedforward Networks Are Universal Approximators." *Neural Networks*, 5(2): 359–366.
- Leive, Adam. 2022. "Health Insurance Design Meets Saving Incentives: Consumer Responses to Complex Contracts." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 14(2).
- Leive, Adam, Leora Friedberg, and Brent Davis. 2022. "Overpaying and Undersaving? Correlated Mistakes in Health Insurance and Retirement Saving."
- Liu, Chenyuan, and Justin Sydnor. 2022. "Dominated Options in Health Insurance Plans." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 14(1): 277–300.
- Maliar, Lilia, Serguei Maliar, and Pablo Winant. 2021. "Deep Learning for Solving Dynamic Economic Models." *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 122(2): 76–101.
- Peter, Richard, Sebastian Soika, and Petra Steinorth. 2016. "Health Insurance, Health Savings Accounts, and Healthcare Utilization." *Health Economics*, 357–371.
- Thaler, Richard, and Cass Sunstein. 2008. *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. Yale University Press.

About the authors

Leora Friedberg is Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. She is also Co-Chair of the Retirement Income Institute and an affiliated researcher of the Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center, a Research Fellow of the TIAA Institute, and a faculty affiliate of the Virginia Center for Tax Law.

Friedberg's research focuses on retirement and saving behavior of older Americans, with topics including Social Security, employer pension and health insurance benefits, the market for current annuity products, and Medicaid long-term care benefits. She has testified in front of the U.S. Congress and participated in the Retirement Security Advisory Panel for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Her research has been funded by the National Institutes of Health and the U.S. Social Security Administration. Friedberg received her Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Friedberg's fields of interest are public and labor economics. Her research focuses on retirement and saving behavior of older Americans, including the Social Security earnings test, the design of employer pension benefits, and the interaction between Medicaid long-term care benefits and household saving and insurance decisions. Additional research studies marriage and divorce in response to bargaining theory, family law, and the U.S. tax code. Her research has been funded by the National Institute on Aging, the U.S. Social Security Administration, and the TIAA Institute.

Friedberg received her Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Adam Leive is an Assistant Professor in the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC-Berkeley. He uses large administrative datasets to study policy-relevant questions at the intersection of health economics, public finance, and insurance. His research seeks to understand consumer behavior in complicated life-cycle decisions that impact economic security, such as health insurance and retirement saving. His research on Health Savings Accounts was awarded the 2022 Samuelson Award by the TIAA Institute for Outstanding Scholarly Writing on Lifelong Financial Security. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School and his B.A. from Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs.

Jaeki Jang is Associate Research Fellow at Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade. His research is focused on labor decisions of heterogeneous households and their aggregate consequences. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Virginia.

Eric Young is Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia and Senior Research Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He is also an Editor at Economics Letters, an Associate Editor at the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, and a member of the advisory board for the Laboratory of Aggregate Economics and Finance at the University of California Santa Barbara.

Young's research broadly investigates the effects of microeconomic heterogeneity and financial imperfections on macroeconomic outcomes, with recent emphasis on consumer default, fiscal policy determination, racial inequality, and the regulation of international capital flows. Young received his Ph.D. in Economics from Carnegie Mellon University.

About the TIAA Institute

The TIAA Institute helps advance the ways individuals and institutions plan for financial security and organizational effectiveness. The Institute conducts in-depth research, provides access to a network of thought leaders, and enables those it serves to anticipate trends, plan future strategies, and maximize opportunities for success.

To learn more, visit www.tiaainstitute.org.



**Join the conversation online:
[@TIAAInstitute](https://twitter.com/TIAAInstitute)**

This project received funding from the TIAA Institute and the University of Virginia 3Cavaliers Fund and Bankard Fund for Political Economy. The content, findings and conclusions are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of TIAA or the TIAA Institute. The views expressed do not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System..

TIAA Institute is a division of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA), New York, NY. ©2023 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund, 730 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017